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Abstract
It is a well known quandry that when countries open their ﬁnancial sectors,
foreign-owned banks appear to bring superior eﬃciency to their host markets
but also charge higher markups on borrowed funds than their domestically
owned rivals, with unknown impacts on interest rates and welfare. Using
heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive lenders, the model illustrates that FDI
can cause markups (the net interest margins commonly used to proxy lending-
to-deposit rate spreads) to increase at the same time eﬃciency gains and local
competition keep the interest rates that banks charge borrowers from rising.
Competition from arms-length foreign loans, however, both squeezes markups
and lowers interest rates. Both scenarios yield large welfare gains compared
with ﬁnancial autarky, except in countries with inferior domestic technologies
or restricted entry by domestic banks.
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The ﬁnancial industry is highly concentrated: the largest 15 multinational banks supply
more than 20% of the world’s private lending.1 When countries contemplate liberaliz-
ing their banking sector to allow foreign participation, a natural tension therefore arises.
There is the hope that foreign participation will reduce interest rates charged to borrowers
through superior technical eﬃciency or increased competition, tempered by the concern
that large foreign banks will amass enormous market power in their host country and end
up increasing interest rates. Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) put it most succinctly when
discussing liberalization, including entry by foreign banks, in Latin America:
“ ...while the process of ﬁnancial market liberalization is fully supported by
policymakers in the region, there is a certain degree of disappointment with
the results. In particular, policymakers expected that interest rate spreads
would converge to international levels... high spreads are usually interpreted as
an indicator of ineﬃciency, which adversely aﬀects domestic real savings and
investment (p.114).”
A number of studies have sought an empirical resolution to this question by testing
the impact of foreign mergers and acquisitions on the net interest margin, the virtually
universal proxy for the spread between the interest rate charged on loans and the one paid
on deposits. The authors have formed a well known puzzle: Though foreign entry generally
seems to improve loan quality and reduce costs among active banks— two characteristics of
increased competitive pressures— it is often associated with increased net interest margins.
Several of these studies also demonstrate the importance of imperfect competition and
heterogeneity among banks when considering the impacts of opening the banking sector to
foreign entry, a combination missing from current theories of ﬁnancial liberalization.
In this paper, we study foreign direct investment (FDI) in the ﬁnancial sector and
arms-length lending by foreign banks in a model with imperfect competition and hetero-
geneous banks, so that we can capture these stylized facts. The model generalizes the
1The 15 largest banks according to asset size are listed in the Euromoney August 2006 issue’s “Bank
Atlas.” Lending is computed from 2006 “net loans” (loans minus loan loss provisions) in the Bankscope
database. World lending is computed as the sum of “net loans” in 2006 for all banks in the database.
1framework of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003, hereafter BEJK) to include for-
eign direct investment2 and pinpoints the importance of the number of potential entrants,
called “contestability” in the context of the banking sector by Claessens and Laeven (2004).
Our model contributes to several literatures examining ﬁnancial and trade liberalization3
linking foreign participation in the banking sector to macroeconomic outcomes. Whereas
most of these papers focus principally on output volatility and the transmission of shocks
after liberalization, we focus on the distribution of markups, costs, and lending rates to
bridge the macroeconomic analysis with a branch of empirical literature that considers the
impact of foreign participation on these three variables.4
In our model, heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency causes liberalization toward foreign par-
ticipation to generate eﬃciency gains, reducing costs and consequently either bearing no
net eﬀect on or actually reducing the average interest rate for borrowers. Liberalization
policies never increase the mean interest rate but, in the case of cross-border takeovers
by foreign banks, can increase net interest margins. An endogenous markup mechanism
in our framework replicates the main stylized fact shown here and in existing micro-level
empirical studies— that bank mergers often increase markups. The mechanism is based on
the BEJK model, which allows for heterogeneity among industry participants while still
incorporating a type of duopolistic competition akin to that embodied in the Salop model
often used for analyses of the banking sector. The intuition is straightforward: A bank
can charge a higher markup if it is more eﬃcient than its next best domestic rival. If it
is taken over by a foreign parent with superior technology, the bank becomes even more
eﬃcient than its next best rival. We also ﬁnd a new conceptualization of contestability:
A market with strong restrictions limiting domestic entry into the banking system is much
more likely to see lower average markups after opening itself to foreign loans (loan liber-
alization) and will see an increase in markups from cross-border bank takeovers. Finally,
we are able to demonstrate that the eﬀects of foreign participation through takeovers are
quite diﬀerent from those of loan liberalization.
2Though quite diﬀerent, our approach was inspired in part by Ramondo’s (2007) expansion of the
Ricardian framework with perfect competition in Eaton and Kortum (2002) to analyze bilateral ﬂows of
FDI in manufacturing industries.
3It complements empirical work by Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000), Reinhardt and Tokatlidis
(2001), Buch, Cartensen, and Schertler (2005), Arena, Reinhart, and Vasquez (2006), Stebunovs (2006),
Ghironi and Stebunovs (2007), and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), for example.
4This branch includes Buch (2000), Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt,
Laeven, and Levine (2003), Claessens and Laeven (2004), and Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004), as well as
others discussed in Section 2 below.
2The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical evidence on
banks and international takeovers. The model, distributions and equilibrium are analyzed
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on markups, the cost
of funds, and welfare. The paper concludes with Section 5.
2 Banks and Foreign Takeovers: Empirical evidence
The most salient fact emerging from studies of liberalization in the banking sector is that
common measures of lending-to-deposit rate spreads in local banks taken over by foreign
ﬁnancial institutions rise after the merger, in part due to an increase in market power. Us-
ing a large panel dataset, Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) ﬁnd that foreign
owned banks have higher net interest margins and proﬁts than domestic banks in develop-
ing countries but not in industrialized countries. Similar facts are reported by a number of
other studies. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) ﬁnd that net interest margins are the same
or higher for foreign-owned banks compared to their domestic counterparts in a study of
ﬁve Latin American countries. The margins are greater for banks entering via M&As and,
importantly, the eﬀect decreases with the age of the merger. Vera, Zambrano-Sequin, and
Faust (2007) show that net interst margins in Venezuela increased approximately 4 percent
within four years of the inﬂux foreign participation initiated by the passage of legislation
in 1994. Manzano and Neri (2001) also note an increase in net interest margins in the
three years following the Philippines’ liberalization toward foreign entry in 1994. Barajas,
Steiner and Salazar (1999) report not only that increasing measures of spreads followed an
inﬂux of foreign participants in Columbia’s banking sector in 1992-96, but also that the
increase was in large part attributable to increased market power.5
Several additional stylized facts also emerge from the empirical literature. Hetero-
geneity is important in a model of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector (Vennet,
5Similar facts are reported by a number of other studies. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) ﬁnd that net
interest margins are the same or higher for foreign-owned banks compared to their domestic counterparts
in a study of ﬁv eL a t i nA m e r i c a nc o u n t r i e s . The margins are greater for banks entering via M&As and,
importantly, the eﬀect decreases with the age of the merger. Vera, Zambrano-Sequin, and Faust (2007)
show that net interst margins in Venezuela increased approximately 4 percent within four years of the inﬂux
foreign participation initiated by the passage of legislation in 1994. Manzano and Neri (2001) also note an
increase in net interest margins in the three years following the Philippines’ liberalization toward foreign
entry in 1994. Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999) report not only that increasing measures of spreads
followed an inﬂux of foreign participants in Columbia’s banking sector in 1992-96, but also that the increase
was in large part attributable to increased market power.
32002; Buch, 2000; and Goldberg, 2007). The role of heterogeneity in lending behavior and
in determining which banks become acquirors or targets has not yet been inculcated into
theoretical models of the banking sector. However, it corresponds well with the empirical
analysis (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005) and theoretical modelling of foreign direct investment
in the trade and open economy macroeconomic literature (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple,
2003; Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; and Russ, 2007). The disconnect is likely because com-
petition between banks is often modelled using the Salop framework.6 Salop’s (1979)
seminal work features monopolistic competition among ﬁrms located symmetrically along
a circle, which derives in duopolistic competition between the two closest ﬁrms. Banks
charge an endogenous markup over the deposit rate. The equilibrium solution depends
on the assumption that banks are identical, so that they charge identical interest rates to
borrowers.
Only one author has successfully introduced heterogeneity among many competitors’
eﬃciency levels in a Salop model in general equilibrium, Vogel (2007a and b).7 Here,
we focus on heterogeneous eﬃciency levels— expanding the degree of heterogeneity beyond
that allowed in Vogel’s work, while preserving the endogenous markups that emerge from
Salop’s duopolistic competition between neighboring banks, via the BEJK setup. If there
is “too much” disparity between competitors’ eﬃciency levels in a Salop model, the more
eﬃcient competitor may absorb the entire market. The BEJK framework allows a full
continuum of heterogeneity between competitors and preserves the duopolistic competition
by limiting market share through a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)8 desire for variety.9 We show that
log of the markup in this model equals the log of the net interest margin, which is commonly
used as a measure of interest rate spreads.
Second, eﬃciency correlates with bank size in the same way as in studies of manufac-
turing ﬁrms by Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007). In
particular, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003) ﬁnd using individual bank balance
6See for example Andr´ es and Arce (2009) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002).
7Croft and Spencer (2004, revision forthcoming) also succeed in introducing heterogeneous Salop-type
transaction costs in a study of ATM charges.
8Constant elasticity of substitution—in BEJK this is the bundling of goods in the utility function. Below,
it is the need for diﬀerent types of credit bundled into the representative ﬁrm’s credit constraint.
9Mandelman (2006) endogenizes this upperbound of the market share in a model of heterogeneous banks
using an elegant mechanism design technique motivated by geographic segmentation of the credit market
within a closed economy. Since our focus is on the impact of foreign participation, we turn to the BEJK
framework where the market shares are limited by customers’ need for a variety of types of diﬀerent kinds
of credit, but duopolistic competition still generates an endogenous markup.
4sheet data that large banks have lower non-interest expenses, including personnel costs.
Thus, when cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) take place, one can expect that
they will involve a larger, more eﬃcient foreign bank taking over a smaller, less eﬃcient
domestic bank.
Third, despite the potentially positive eﬀect on market power and markups, Focarelli
and Panetta (2003) ﬁnd long-run eﬃciency gains following domestic bank mergers. Their
study focuses on the market for bank deposits rather than the net interest margin, using
data on actual deposit rates paid to borrowers. They argue that the long-run eﬃciency
gains from mergers eventually generate more favorable deposit rates, outweighing the short-
run impact of increases in market power.10 We do not capture cost-cutting behavior by
domestic banks, but foreign entry does select out the higher-cost domestic banks in the
model, as well as lower costs in the target banks after takeover.
Fourth, using bank-level data on lending and deposit rates, Brock and Franken (2003)
ﬁnd that net interest margins are positively correlated with bank concentration,11 whereas
actual spreads are negatively correlated with concentration. This suprising ﬁnding is
explained in our model because eﬃcient banks charge lower actual spreads on average,
giving them a larger market share, but can also potentially charge larger markups if they
are much more eﬃcient than their next-best competitor.
Fifth, Claessens and Laeven (2004), working with a panel of 50 countries, ﬁnd that
foreign entry increases the degree of competition in the banking industry, but that domes-
tic restrictions on bank participation are up to ten times more inﬂuential on the overall
competitiveness of the environment. They call the ease of domestic participation in vari-
ous credit niches “contestability” and, generalizing the BEJK framework, we also ﬁnd that
it has a big inﬂuence over how likely foreign entry is to reduce markups and the average
lending rate.
Finally, several papers indicate that increasing distance between countries—whether
geographic, linguistic, or cultural—reduces both cross-border mergers and acquisitions in
the banking sector and banks’ holdings of net foreign assets (Buch, 2005; and Buch, Driscoll
and Ostergaard, 2005). In the model below, distance plays a big role in diﬀerentiating
between the impact of FDI versus liberalization toward foreign loans. When distance deters
10Hannan and Prager (1998) quantify increases in market power after mergers using U.S. deposit rate
data.
11The positive correlation between net interest margins and concentration is also observed in the euro
area by Corvoisier and Gropp (2002).
5arms-length foreign lending to home ﬁrms, this type of ﬁnancial liberalization naturally
has little eﬀect on markups or interest rates.
3 A Model of Heterogeneous Banks in Financial Autarky
The model economy is composed of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks. For simplicity, there
is no depreciating physical capital and any potential shocks that could aﬀect demand
or production in a particular period are already realized at the time agents make their
decisions. Thus, we omit time subscripts in our exposition except when describing the
consumer’s savings behavior below. This simpliﬁed framework allows us to concentrate on
the modelling of the banking sector, and still derive some general equilibrium implications.
Our objective is to analyze the general equilibrium eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness in three
diﬀerent scenarios: ﬁnancial autarky (our benchmark); free access to foreign loans (what
we call loan liberalization); and entry of foreign banks via mergers and acquisitions (foreign
direct investment). We begin the description of the economy under ﬁnancial autarky, with
special emphasis on the banking sector.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households in the interval [01]. Individuals in this economy
consume a ﬁnal good and work at the ﬁrms which produce it. They have funds each
period that are deposited at the bank in return for some interest. Households are assumed
to own both ﬁrms and banks, so at the end of every period they receive dividends from
these activities.














where  is consumption and h is labor supply in period . The exogenous parameters 
and  are, respectively, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of labor







6subject to the following budget constraint:
+1 +  ≤ ¯  + h + 
 + 
 
where  are one-period deposits at the banks,  are real wages, ¯  is the gross market
interest rate on deposits, and 
 and 
 are proﬁts from ﬁrms and banks, respectively.
Consumers are indiﬀerent with regard to the banks where they deposit their funds, so they
simply divide total deposits, .
3.2 Firms
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms in the interval [01] that produce the
ﬁnal good devoted to consumption. They need to hire workers in order to start production,
but do not have funds until after the goods are sold, so they must borrow this working
capital.
Let the aggregate price level of the homogeneous domestically produced ﬁnal good
( ≡ 1) be the numeraire. Technology is given by  = 1−. The representative ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁts12
 = 1− − − ( − 1)
and
 =  
where  is the total amount of loans borrowed by the ﬁrm;  is labor demand;  is the
unit input cost, taken as given by ﬁrms;  is the gross aggregate interest rate on the total
of loans; and  is an aggregate productivity parameter. The ﬁrst order condition with








For simplicity and because ﬁrms often have a portfolio of loans with slightly diﬀerent
purposes and associated services (mortgages, car loans, small business loans, corporate
12We focus on steady-state analysis and thus omit time subscripts for the remainder of the discussion.
Since the subjective discount factor for consumers who own ﬁrms equals a constant () in steady state, we
ignore the discount factor without loss of generality.
7credit, trade credit, etc.), we assume that the representative ﬁrm demands a portfolio
of loans, with loans of diﬀerent types combined using a constant elasticity of substitution,
1.13 Given that there are thousands of ﬁrms in any particular country, it is reasonable
to assume that a representative ﬁrm assembles a basket of  diﬀerent types of loans and
may substitute between them based on the terms (interest rate charges) of each type.14
Equivalently, we could assume that a representative ﬁrm chooses to borrow from only
one bank at a time, where either the bank’s expected variable transaction cost or the
ﬁrm’s understanding of the precise interest rate implied by the loan contract has a random
component with a logit distribution.15
In either case, the representative ﬁrm chooses the optimal demand for loans from bank

























13The CES speciﬁcation employed here is not restrictive, since as shown by Head and Mayer (2001) it is
equivalent to modelling “[...]a large number of heterogeneous consumers that each purchase only a single
variety.”
14The diﬀerences between each type of loan can arise due to geographic segmentation of the market, or to
ad e m a n df o rd i ﬀerent types of credit services in which banks might specialize, or even due to preferences
regarding superﬁcial aspects of customer service like the training and behavior of the loan oﬃcers or the
format of online services. In fact, there is quite a bit of empirical evidence documenting that ﬁrms typically
take out loans from multiple banks (Udell, 2007; Bannier, 2005; Shikimi, 2005; and Escudero, 2003). At
the upper end are ﬁrms in Italy, which have relationships with on average between 11 and 30 diﬀerent
banks, depending on ﬁrm size (D’Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz, 1998). A more typical average number of
banks used by ﬁrms in industrialized countries would be closer to 6, as Bannier (2005) reports is found
in several studies of Germany. Among small- and medium-sized ﬁrms in Japan, the average number of
banking relationships is 4 (Shikimi 2005), which is closer to the number of recorded relationships per ﬁrm
in Argentina. Streb, Bolzico, and Druck, Henke, Rutman, and Escudero (2003) report that 75 percent of
Argentinian ﬁrms have relationships with between 3 and 15 banks, with the average number increasing in
the size of total liabilities.
15See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1988) or Verboven (1996) for derivations reconciling a represen-
tative consumer framework with the Dixit-Stiglitz preference speciﬁcation.
8where the aggregate market interest rate, , comes from minimizing the cost of one bundle











3.3 The banking sector
Banks in this economy are distributed in niches indexed by ,w i t hat o t a lo f niches.
Within each niche, banks draw an individual cost parameter that characterizes the calibre
of their management and technology.16 Let () ≥ 1 for all  denote the cost parameter
of the th most eﬃcient bank in sector  of a particular country. The cost parameter can
represent any per-unit non-interest expenditures (for instance, on personnel and facilities),
or institutional lags that prevent deposits from immediately converted to loans due to
ineﬃciency. If we were to include a uniform probability of default, or the ﬁrm’s incentive
to repudiate the debt, then the cost parameter is also analogous to a monitoring cost as
in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), or a repudiation cost as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
The key is that the cost drives a wedge between the rates that banks pay on deposits and
the minimum interest rates they can charge to lenders, whether it is due to risk, eﬃciency,
or both. The bank’s cost per dollar of loans supplied is then ¯ (), with ¯  being the
risk-free rate paid to depositors.
Within each niche, banks compete by strategically setting their interest rates, so that
only the bank charging the lowest interest rate— the bank with the lowest cost for a par-
ticular type of loan— supplies loans in that market segment. The unit cost function for
the supplier in niche  is thus ¯ 1(), with 1()=m i n{()}. As described in BEJK,
this low-cost supplier can not charge more than the marginal cost of the second-lowest cost
ﬁrm. Otherwise it will be undersold by this next most eﬃcient competitor. It would like
to charge the maximum markup possible, the standard Dixit-Stiglitz markup, ¯  = 
−1,
but can only do this if the cost of its next-best competitor exceeds its own unit cost times
the maximum markup, or 2()  ¯ 1(). This duopolistic competition between banks
implies that the lending-to-deposit rate spread is ultimately endogenous. Thus, we have
16We can assume that each bank competes in only one niche or that all banks draw a separate i.i.d. cost
parameter for each of the  niches, but with no economies of scope.








with proﬁts for the niche- bank supplier equal to
()=()() − ¯ ()
where () is the supply of loans by bank ,a n d() represents the amount of deposits
the bank collects to make the loans and cover non-interest expenses incurred before loans
are repaid.17 Since households are indiﬀerent regarding where to deposit, the amount
of deposits held in any particular bank, (), diﬀers across banks only due to diﬀerences
in banks’ requirements for deposits to make loans. We assume that the number of credit
“niches,” , is large enough that each bank takes the aggregate interest rate and the
aggregate demand for loans as given. Banks transform the deposits they receive into loans




, ∀()  1; (1)
that is, more eﬃcient banks (lower ()) would be able to supply more loans out of
deposits than less eﬃcient ones.
Many studies have used net interest rate margins as a proxy for markups when analyzing
the impact of ﬁnancial sector liberalization on borrowing costs due to data constraints. Few
authors have had access to actual data on lending and deposit rates and instead rely on
measures of the net interest margin, as we do here. However, using the model we can still
map the distribution of markups into the distribution of net interest margins. In particular,
it is simple to show that the log of the markup is approximately equal to the net interest
17We assume for simplicity that bank working capital is thus drawn from deposits, but the same cost
structure would result even if working capital was derived from the funds of bank owners, since the oppor-
tunity cost of putting up the funds would be the rate of interest on deposits.
10margin. The log markup is given by
log()=l o g () − log ¯ 1()
≈ [() − 1] − [¯ 1() − 1]
= () − ¯ 1()
The “wide” net interest margin,18 equal to total interest revenues minus total interest
expenditures divided by assets equals
 =
()() − ¯ ()
()
= () − ¯ 1()
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d()=1()() Thus, the model’s depiction of markups is easily
reconciled with existing empirical research.
3.4 Distributions for cost parameters and the markup
To close the model, we need to specify the distribution of costs for banks, which allows one
to calculate the distribution for markups and . We assume that each rival competing in
niche  draws its cost parameter from an identical, independent Weibull function,
()=1− −(−1)

with positive support over [1∞)19 that is, the probability that a bank can loan out funds
for less than the rate of interest on deposits (i.e., 1) is zero. Given  potential entrants
in the niche, let 1 represent the eﬃciency level of the most eﬃcient ( lowest-cost) lender
and 2 the eﬃciency level of the second most eﬃcient ((−1) lowest-cost) lender. Then,
one can derive the joint density for the two lowest record values, −1(1 2)u s i n ga
18This is deﬁnition 4w in Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000, p.122) and is also used by Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Huizinga. (2001), among numerous others.
19This is akin to assuming that banks draw an eﬃciency parameter  from a Fr´ echet distribution of the
form ()=1− 
−−
with support over (01], with unit cost given by ¯  =
¯ 
. The Weibull function
used here implies that the marginal cost of loaning one dollar is greater than or equal to the gross deposit
rate (1). The Fr´ echet distribution is also known as the “inverse Weibull.”






= ( − 1)()
2 (1 − 1)
−1 (2 − 1)
−1 −(1−1)
−(2−1)(−1)
Notice that the implied marginal density for 2 is inﬂuenced by the number of rivals in
the niche :
2(2)=( − 1)(2 − 1)
−1 −(2−1)(−1)
Eaton and Kortum (2007) assume that this number of potential suppliers is Poisson dis-
tributed, a very realistic assumption for their examination of trade in goods across many
diﬀerent industries. With the special functional forms in their study, the number of ri-
vals elegantly averages out into a function of the parameters governing the distribution
of unit cost parameters (Eaton and Kortum 2007, Chapter 4 Appendix). In the speciﬁc
case of the banking industry, government policy could bear an enormous impact on the
number of potential entrants in each segment of the lending market. Thus, we use an
exogenous parameter  to embody the concept of contestability examined empirically in
the cross-country banking study by Claessens and Laeven (2004).
The markup charged by any particular supplier is ()=
()
¯ 1(). Since the lowest-cost
bank (1()) wants to charge the highest markup possible subject to the cost of its next
most eﬃcient competitor in the niche (2()), and the elasticity of ﬁrms’ demand for loans
(), the markup it charges is given by







We assume that bank eﬃciency levels are constant over time, making the markup a constant
unless there is an inﬂux of new competitors due to liberalization. Following BEJK, one































If there were no lower bound for the cost parameter, then the cumulative distribution
would reduce to the expression in BEJK, which is entirely independent of 2 ()=
1 − −. A simple simulation demonstrates that we obtain a distribution with a pdf of
roughly Pareto shape, shown in Figure 1a. The simulation is done by ﬁr s tt a k i n g1 1d r a w s
(i.e.  ≡ 11)20 from a transform of () based on a uniformly distributed variable .W e
ﬁnd 1()=1,t h el o w e s t drawn from this sample of 100 and 2()=2, the second





,w h e r e¯  is calibrated
using the maximum net interest margin in the Bankscope sample described above implies
 =5 87,21 so we choose  = 6. Following the suggestion in Eaton and Kortum (2002), we
then set  equal to  and set  equal to 1 to correspond with the normalization used in our
presentation of the empirical estimation of  below. The process is repeated to calculate
the markup for 100 niches. Finally, the entire distribution is simulated 1000 times. The
x-axis of Figure 1a is the markup value, and the y axis the probability that any of the
markups is within a narrow interval (0.004) of markup values.
Notice that we have set the number of potential rivals equal to 100 in this example.
Because the distribution of markups here is not separable from the distribution of 2,i ta l s o
depends on the level of contestability in the market (as seen in the formula for (2)a b o v e ) .
To illustrate, Figure 1b shows the distribution of markups when the level of contestability
20We calibrate the number of rivals based on the value of  for the United States found in de Blas
and Russ (2009), which we estimate based on the ratio between the number of banks in the data and the
population size.
21Speciﬁcally, Bankscope reports a maximum net interest margin of approximately 21 percent. Having
shown above that the net interest margin is the log of the markup, we impute the maximum markup from
t h em a x i m u mn e ti n t e r e s tm a r g i na n db a c ko u ta =5 87.















(a) n = 11











(b) n = 2
Figure 1: Probability density of markups with high versus low contestability in the banking
sector
in each niche is extremely low, so that  = 2. The number of banks in the entire banking
industry charging very low markups (near 1) is dramatically curtailed, while the fraction
of all banks charging the upperbound, ¯  = 
−1, more than triples, exceeding 15 percent.
Due to its impact on the distribution of markups, increasing contestability (an increase in
) on average reduces the aggregate interest rate.
In a related study (de Blas and Russ (2009)), we estimate the parameters of the Weibull
distribution employed in this paper to match the distribution of costs in a panel of countries,
using the ratio of deposits to loans to measure the cost parameter, exactly as modelled
here. An application of the Ansari-Bradley test indicates that there is little variation
across countries in the estimates for the technology parameter, , while the number of
competitors (our measure of contestability) does vary considerably more. The results imply
14that bank competition within niches ()i sam o r ei m p o r t a n tf a c t o rd r i v i n gd i ﬀerences in
the distribution of markups across countries than diﬀerences in available technology. This
ﬁnding is consistent with those of Claessens and Laeven (2004) regarding the importance
of contestability— the degree of domestic entry— in driving the competitiveness of bank
pricing behavior.
3.5 Equilibrium
The next step is to deﬁne equilibrium and the properties of the steady state. An equi-
librium under autarky in this economy is deﬁned by a set of quantities and prices such
that households, ﬁrms, and banks solve their maximization problems and that markets
clear, {¯ ()()()}. The equilibrium conditions emerge from the
consumer’s intertemporal optimization (derived Appendix C); the ﬁrm’s demand for labor
and loans; banks’ price setting; the goods, deposit, and loan market clearing conditions;
and the deﬁnition of the aggregate interest rate. These are shown for the steady state in
Table 1.
4T h e m a r k u p , ﬁnancial sector liberalization, and the cost
of funds
From this point, the characterization of ﬁnancial sector liberalization is important to predict
the impact of liberalization on interest rate spreads. If liberalization is deﬁned as the ability
to borrow from banks located overseas, “importing” bank loans from abroad, then it can
be shown numerically that the distribution of markups retains a roughly Pareto-like shape.
Using data from the simulation technique above repeated for two identical countries, Figure
2b shows that under this type of loan liberalization, the distribution of markups is quite
similar to that under autarky in Figure 1, which is presented here for ease of comparison in
panel 2a. We will show below that in this benchmark setup with no geographic frictions, the
distribution of markups and interest rates charged to borrowers under loan liberalization
is, on average, stochastically dominated by the distribution under autarky: the average
markup and interest rate fall under cross-border loan liberalization. One might deﬁne the
average markup in the home country as an arithmetic mean, 1

P








1−  where  represents the number of market
niches, equal to 100 in each iteration. In the simulation exercise here, both measures of
15Consumers
Labor supply  = h
− 1
 (1)
Euler condition ¯  = 1
 (2)
Budget constraint  = h +  +  + ¯  (3)
Firms
Technology  = 1− (4)

















Market Clearing and Aggregation








Goods market clearing  ≡  (11)









Labor market clearing h ≡  (13)









































Figure 2: Probability density of markups: Autarky versus openness
the average markup fall. This is largely because the expected markup is not separable
from the cost parameter of the second-lowest-cost supplier and allowing ﬁrms to borrow
from foreign banks has an eﬀect similar to increasing contestability. Futher, the average
interest rate, , falls in all 1000 trials.
We can also compute the fraction of niches that will be supplied by foreign loans.
When both countries are identical, the fraction is one half on average. If one country has
lower contestability () or a lower technology parameter (the scale parameter, ), it will
naturally experience higher rates of foreign participation.
Buch (2000) ﬁnds that the foreign asset holdings of banks fall with geographic dis-
tance. The loan liberalization in Figure 2b presumes that there is an extra cost involved
in supplying loans to overseas ﬁrms, so that the marginal cost of lending is 1()¯ ,
17with   1. This distance factor could represent all sorts of frictions, from added
costs involved in locating and advertising for potential borrowers overseas to the cost of
hedging exchange rate risk. As  increases, fewer and fewer foreign banks supply credit
to home ﬁrms and the distribution of markups under liberalization converges to the home
distribution under autarky. Figure 3 shows that the cdfs under liberalization (with and




































Loan Liberalization with Distance
Loan Liberalization no Distance
Figure 3: Markups are lower under loan liberalization compared to autarky
without distance) still do not cross the cdf under autarky. Indeed, as the distance factor
increases (in Figure 3, we present  = 1 in the case with no distance,  =1 1i n
the case with distance), limiting the number of foreign sources of credit, the cdf under
liberalization simply converges to the distribution seen under autarky. Thus, the autarkic
distribution of markups always ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates or closely overlaps with
the distribution after loan liberalization—i.e., loan liberalization almost always reduces the
18average markup and is most likely to do so when costs arising from distance are small.
Below, we elaborate on this result and contrast it with openness to FDI in the ﬁnancial
sector.
4.1 FDI in the banking sector
Expanding the model to allow foreign takeovers of home banks provides a theoretical reason
for why spreads may actually increase among banks taken over by a foreign parent, as
documented in developing countries by Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001).
The intuition is straightforward and hinges on heterogeneous levels of eﬃciency among
banks. First, consider a world where banks can buyout overseas banks only in their own
niche through a bidding process. Buch (2000) reports evidence suggesting that parent
banks are more eﬃcient than the banks they acquire. Suppose that the foreign bank in
niche  is more eﬃcient than the lowest cost home bank, ∗
1()  1(), but the unit cost
of the merged bank after a foreign takeover is some average of the two technologies. For
instance, let the unit cost following the buyout, where a low-cost bank from niche  in the








with  ≥ 1.22
Because the lowest-cost foreign bank will be able to run a more eﬃcient home branch
after a merger, it can charge lower lending rates, lend out more money, and reap more
proﬁts from the venture than the second-lowest-cost foreign bank could possibly do, given
its inferior technology. Thus, it is immediately obvious that the most eﬃcient foreign bank
will be able to outbid the second-most eﬃcient foreign bank for any potential target in the
host country. We also assume that parent banks can only acquire active banks, so only
the best bank in each niche is a potential target.23 The parent bank buys out the target
22The assumption is in the spirit of Nocke and Yeaple’s (2007) modeling of foreign direct investment
given mobile versus immobile technologies—the technology here is partially mobile, as the foreign parent
must rely on the acquired ﬁrm for some know-how to help navigate the local market. In a more elaborate
framework with asymmetric information, the acquired bank might have important information about the
creditworthiness of local borrowers.
23We relaxed this assumption in previous versions of the paper with qualitatively similar results. We
adopt the simplifying assumption here to preclude domestic mergers and to keep the focus on the eﬀects of
foreign participation. (Costly domestic mergers undertaken to increase potential markups by buying out
the next-best competitor would simply shift the mass toward the upper end of the distribution of markups
19by paying a dividend equal to the maximum of either (i) whatever proﬁts the target would
have made if it had been bought out by the second-highest foreign bidder in exchange for
all operating proﬁts, or (ii) whatever proﬁts the target would make if it does not sell out.
The pricing of the takeover is speciﬁed in detail in Appendix B. The cherry-picking of
the most eﬃcient local bank in the niche is a result, rather than an assumption— taking
all other banks’ behavior as given, the Dixit-Stiglitz bundling of loans guarantees that a
merged bank is most proﬁtable and thus aﬀords the target the most advantageous buyout
when the most eﬃcient foreign rival in its niche is the acquiror.
What is the impact of the mergers on markups? Given that the most eﬃcient foreign
bank buys out the most eﬃcient home bank, the matching process generates a distribution
of markups under direct investment liberalization that stochastically dominates the distri-
bution of the markup under either autarky or loan liberalization. The markup will increase
in all merged banks that were not already charging ¯ . The markup will never increase
for local banks that are not bought out by foreigners. Therefore, merged banks in any
sample will display a higher propensity to increase markups, while each surviving domes-
tically owned bank will have a markup that remains unchanged from its pre-liberalization
level. Surviving domestically owned banks will on average be more eﬃcient than the
pre-liberalization sample, since less eﬃcient domestic banks are more likely to be merged.
To show the overall eﬀect on the distributions, we use the same data from the simulation
above. The distribution of markups under FDI liberalization stochastically dominates
the distribution under autarky (Figure 4). The cdf for markups under FDI liberalization
crosses the cdf under autarky, meaning FDI increases the average markup.
In contrast, the cdf for markups under loan liberalization will generally billow to the
left, above the cdf under autarky when the home and foreign country have the same level of
technology, . Loan liberalization will increase the markup in a particular niche only when
three conditions hold: ∗
1()  1(), ∗






1(). Put another way,
these three conditions imply that inﬂows of foreign loans will only increase the spread in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y ’ sn i c h e if both low-cost foreign banks have superior eﬃciency to the
low-cost home banks and there is already a larger spread in the foreign country’s niche
. When these conditions jointly occur, the home country eﬀectively “imports” a higher
markup from the foreign country in that particular niche. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, loan liberalization will either reduce or have no eﬀect the on markup. Only the
with no important qualitative implications for our analysis of FDI.)
20ﬁrst condition is necessary for a cross-border merger to increase a target bank’s markup
and this is the same necessary condition for a merger to take place. Therefore, whereas
the distribution of markups under FDI stochastically dominates the distribution under
autarky, the distribution of markups under loan liberalization is stochastically dominated
by the autarkic distribution.












































Figure 4: Eﬀects of liberalization on the distribution of markups, costs, and interest rates
Table A.1 shows summary statistics for net interest margins, the ratio of overhead
expenses to total interest earning assets, and the ratio of personnel expenses to total
interest earning assets for a panel of 80 countries. The data are split by whether there was
a surge in foreign takeovers in the ﬁnancial sector between 2000 and 2006 for any length
of time.24 All countries saw both net interest margins and costs drop by more than 10%
24We run break tests, described in the Appendix, to identify a surge in foreign takeovers in the ﬁnancial
industry recorded in the Thomson SDC database. In the table we split the data by whether there is at
least one test indicating the existence of a surge.
21between 2000 and 2006. However, in countries for which there is some evidence of a surge
during the sample period, the drop in the mean of average costs was between 40 and 180
percent bigger than the drop for net interest margins. This is in contrast to countries
exhibiting no evidence of a surge, where the mean for the net interest margin and for costs
dropped at about the same rate. In our model, an increase in arms-length foreign loans
would reduce net interest margins across most banks, while FDI occurring at the same
time would dampen the fall, just as we see in the data.
4.2 Bank eﬃciency and interest rates
What do increased markups mean for ﬁrms? Eﬃciency gains prevent these increased av-
erage markups from translating into higher borrowing costs. The distribution of costs and
under autarky stochastically dominates the distributions for either loan or FDI liberaliza-
tion (Figure 4, middle panel). Increased markups from foreign takeovers are completely
oﬀset by the fall in costs: the average interest rate under ﬁnancial FDI is virtually un-
changed from autarky and actualy falls a miniscule amount. Mergers therefore increase
banking sector eﬃciency to a degree that supercedes the impact of increased market power
arising within a few sectors. This is evident in the bottom panel of Figure 4— the cumula-
tive distribution of interest rates for ﬁnancial FDI is almost identical to that for autarky.
The autarkic distribution of interest rates stochastically dominates the one for loan lib-
eralization. Thus, we can say unequivocally that neither type of liberalization increases
lending rates, even though FDI increases markups. Numerical computations conﬁrm that
this is true in 100 percent of the simulated cases.
Theoretically, we can show why. Although the markup may increase, the actual spread
always falls after a merger. Recall that the acquiring bank is always more eﬃcient than
the target, or 
1 ()  1(). Then, the interest rate for the merged bank will be
()=m i n
©




The cost parameter of the second-best supplier of credit to niche  in the domestic market
will either stay the same (2()¯ ) after FDI liberalization, meaning the interest rate in
niche  will never increase and may fall if the targeted domestic bank was already charging
¯  before merging. With a constant deposit rate, ¯ , that means that the actual spread
(() − ¯ , before the merger) can stay the same or decrease while the markup increases or
stays the same due to the increased eﬃciency of the merged bank.
22Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) oﬀer evidence that domestic banks
appear to increase their eﬃciency following entry by foreign banks. In our model, we
can observe what empirically looks like increased eﬃciency in the domestic banking sector
simply because the domestic banks that still supply loans after liberalization are some of
t h em o s te ﬃcient banks in the domestic market. The appearance of increased eﬃciency
may also simply be evidence of unmerged local banks having to lower their markups. How-
ever, as suggested by Goldberg (2007), increased eﬃciency among unmerged local banks
could also occur due to technological spillover from foreign entrants to these locally owned
competitors, or induced cost-cutting behavior. In the case of technological spillover or cost-
cutting, the technology parameter, , would presumably be higher for the foreign-owned
banking industry than for the indigenous banks, or   , at the time of liberalization.
One should then observe a leftward shift in the distribution of cost parameters for sur-
viving indigenous banks over and above the selection eﬀect involved in liberalization, an
empirically testable implication that we leave for future research.
4.3 Technology vs. contestability
The impact of either type of liberalization on the distribution of markups and lending
rates in the home country is similar whether the home market opens up to a country with
higher mean technology ()o rh i g h e rc o n t e s t a b i l i t y( ). Recall that, as in Figure 1b,
countries with low contestability have a ﬂat pdf with a large “spike” at the upper end of
the probability density for markups. Comparing Figures 2a and 2c, we see that allowing
foreign takeovers moves the mass of the distribution of markups to the right, and increases
the number of banks charging the maximum markup.
When foreign banks enter a market with low contestability, the spike increases even
more. Figure 5b shows a case where a country with low contestability opens up to a
world with similar banking technology but higher contestability. The number of banks
charging the maximum markup is more than 4 times larger than in the case of FDI with
high contestability, and more than twice as large as in the case of low contestability under
autarky, as shown in 1b. The same holds true if a country with low technology opens to
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Figure 5: Financial FDI when contestability or technology are lower in the host country
4.4 Welfare eﬀects
Since the impact of ﬁnancial openness on the aggregate interest rate is computable using
only data from the simulated cost parameters, it is possible to solve for all variables in
terms of the aggregate interest rate using the open economy version of the steady state
equations in Table 1. We transform the consumer’s budget constraint (3) and the goods
clearing condition (11) into two new equations,
 =  + 
 = + 
 + 
 + ∗
 + (¯  − 1) − ∗
 +  −  ∗ ((3’))
 =  +  ((11’))
24where  and  denote the quantity of the manufactured good that is produced in the
home and foreign country, respectively, and consumed in the home country.  is the total
of all takeover fees paid to owners of native home-country banks acquired by foreign-owned
banks. Proﬁts earned by home and foreign banks, respectively, in the home country are
represented by 
 and 
 . Variables representing consumption, production, or payments
taking place in the foreign country are denoted by asterices. That is, ∗
 represents proﬁts
earned by home-owned banks in the foreign country, and  ∗ is the total of all takeover fees
paid by home acquirors to the owners of targeted foreign banks.
The balance of payments equation is given by
 = ∗
 −  ≡ (
 −  ) − (∗
 −  ∗) (13)
where ∗
 is consumption of goods produced by home ﬁrms in the foreign country. That is, a
home export surplus must be ﬁnanced by the positive net proﬁts of foreign banks operating
in the home country. Analogous equations apply to the foreign country in equilibrium.
The open economy diﬀers from autarky because bank proﬁts now include activity from
making loans abroad, be it at arms-length under loan liberalization or in local branches
with FDI. Trade in goods does not have to be balanced if bank proﬁts, net of takeover
fees, are greater for one country than another. With the interest rates already given
by computations above, we reduce the model into two equations (the aggregate budget
constraints) and two unknowns,  and ∗, then solve using a nonlinear equation solver.
The overall eﬀect of loan liberalization is to reduce the average interest rate, which
increases consumption and utility. Computations using data from the simulations above25
are reported in Table 2 and show that moving from autarky to loan liberalization implies
an increase of consumption of around 28.2% in terms of consumption under autarky. Fur-
thermore, going from autarky to FDI in the ﬁnancial sector improves welfare even more,
implying an increase in consumption by more than 200% compared to consumption under
autarky. In both cases, the result stems from the increased eﬃciency with which banks
are serving their borrowers.
However, the channels through which the increased eﬃciency translates into welfare
gains are completely diﬀerent. Loan liberalization transforms increased eﬃciency into
lower ﬁnancing costs for borrowers. Bank proﬁts may increase due to new overseas lend-
25We report results for calibration with standard values  =0 36,  = 1 (logarithmic utility), and  =1
(unit elasticity of labor supply), and choose  =1 10 and  =2 .
25Compensated variation:
Required increase in autarkic consumption to reach post-lib. welfare levels
Autarky → Loan Lib. Autarky → Financial FDI
Baseline 0.282 2.333
=1 1 =2 =  = 
High arms-length friction 0.281 –
=1 5
High technological hangup for FDI – 2.058
=1 0
Lower home technology -0.004 0.749
=1=2
Lower home contestability – -0.342
=2 =1 1
Table 2: Welfare eﬀects of liberalization
ing, but only because a particular bank can oﬀer a lower interest rate to overseas ﬁrms than
their local bank. Financial FDI transforms increased eﬃciency into higher markups and
therefore proﬁts for banks, with little or no change in interest rates charged to borrowers.
In addition, for a merger to occur, the foreign bank must buy out the local one, so the
increased proﬁts are split between the foreign bank and the local one due to the takeover
payments. It follows that when a country with inferior technology or contestability opens
to FDI, the welfare gains are dramatically reduced or even reversed, in the case of very
low contestability (=2 = 11). The implication is clear: the most important thing
a country can do to reap welfare gains from ﬁnancial openness is to encourage competi-
tion and improvements in technical eﬃciency among domestic banks at the same time it
liberalizes toward foreign participation.
Ac o u n t r yw i t hal e s se ﬃcient banking sector will also run a trade surplus, paid for
with the excess proﬁts of foreign banks. Under FDI, for instance, a country with lower
overall technology (lower ) will run a persistent trade surplus, paid for by the net proﬁts
of resident foreign banks. Under loan liberalization, the surplus is paid for with proﬁts
from arms-length loans made in the home country by foreign banks in excess of the proﬁts
made from arms-length loans made by home country banks to foreign ﬁrms. When both
countries are identical, either country can run a trade surplus or deﬁcit, depending on the
particular draws of cost parameters by individual banks.
265 Conclusions
This study draws on well known stylized facts from the empirical banking literature to
analyze the implications of ﬁnancial sector openness for consumption, welfare, and the
components of the balance of payments. It abstracts from issues such as currency and
maturity mismatches that are discussed in depth in the international ﬁnance literature,
but focuses on the interaction of imperfect competition and bank heterogeneity—the ﬁrst
to do so in a general equilibrium environment. We ﬁnd that opening the ﬁnancial sector
to mergers and acquisitions by foreign acquirors can increase average net interest margins
(markups), an ubiquitous proxy for lending-to-deposit rate spreads, while still generating
eﬃciency gains that never increase rates and may reduce the costs of borrowing. It is the
ﬁrst model to explain why widening measures of interest rate spreads under liberalization
do not imply increased interest rates for borrowers and that increases in net interest margins
are less likely to occur when opening to foreign loans as opposed to FDI in the banking
sector..
With regard to less ﬁnancially developed nations, we show that opening to foreign
takeovers in the banking sector is not a substitute for improving domestic banking insti-
tutions. Our ﬁndings suggest that to get the most beneﬁt from foreign entry, a country
should promote increased competition and technical eﬃciency among domestic banks. For
ﬁnancially advanced countries, the analysis provides an argument for liberalizing a coun-
try’s banking sector to foreign entry even if its banking sector is already technically eﬃcient
relative to the rest of the world, since only competitors that are superior in a particular
niche buy out local banks. In addition, proﬁts earned from overseas lending yield a big
domestic consumption boost and may even end up ﬁnancing a persistent trade deﬁcit.
The stylized facts upon which we base our analysis come with several caveats. First,
do actual net interest margins increase as a result of the takeover, as in the model, or are
foreign banks good at choosing targets for whom market conditions are about to cause
margins to increase? The model here does not resolve this problem, which permeates
the entire literature on spreads and foreign takeovers. We simply oﬀer an explanation
whereby one might observe increased measures of spreads following foreign entry but still
see improvements in lending rates and welfare. Second, we do not model default or prob-
lems associated with asymmetric information, which naturally can also increase spreads.
However, to the degree that local banks have information about local borrowers, the main
engines driving the results— the cherry-picking of the best targets in the model and the
27inability of foreign banks to transfer their own technology seemlessly — are even more
plausible.
The omission most likely to alter the results is the potential consolidation or elimination
of branches that might arise due to economies of scope. This eﬀect could occur either due
to foreign or to domestic merger activity, which we do not explore here. The Ricardian
framework in the model above leaves the number of credit niches ﬁxed (though the number
of banks is not necessarily ﬁxed if we assume that banks can take draws of cost parameters
in any niche without economies of scope.) There is some evidence in recent literature
that consolidation occurring after liberalization may cause reductions in the availability of
credit to small ﬁrms, an important credit niche for innovation and growth in an economy.
This might occur if the proﬁt margins of some local banks who do not sell out are squeezed
so that they are less likely to take on riskier loans, or if the superior eﬃciency of foreign
acquirors involves being less willing to take on risk than their targets. Empirical studies are
already addressing these questions, but theory has lagged behind. The interaction of an
endogenous number of heterogeneous borrowers (or niches) and heterogeneous banks could
further enrich our understanding of changes in market power that occur due to foreign
entry and their implications for actual and proxied interest rate spreads.
References
[1] Ahsanullah, Mohammad. 2004. Record Values—Theory and Applications. Lanham,
MD: University Press of America.
[2] Andr´ es, Javier and ´ Oscar Arce. 2009. Banking Competition, Housing Prices and
Macroeconomic Stability. Banco de Espa˜ na Working Papers 0830.
[3] Arena, Marco, Carmen Reinhart, and Francisco Vasquez. 2006. The Lending Channel
in Emerging Economies: Are Foreign Banks Diﬀerent? NBER Working Paper No.
12340 (June).
[4] Arnold, Jens Matthias and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik. 2005. Gifted Kids or Pushy
Parents? Foreign Acquisitions and Plant Performance in Indonesia. CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 5065.
[5] Bai, Jushan and Pierre Perron. 2003. Computation and Analysis of Multiple Struc-
tural Change Models. Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(1): 1-22.
28[6] Bannier, Christina. 2005. Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing under Uncertainty:
Does it Reduce Ineﬃcient Credit Decisions? Goethe University Frankfurt am Main
Finance and Accounting Working Paper Series No. 149.
[7] Barajas, Adolfo, Roberto Steiner, and Natalia Salazar. 1999. Interest Spreads in
Banking in Colombia, 1974-1996. IMF Staﬀ Papers 46(2): 196-224.
[8] Barrett, Garry F. and Stephen G. Donald. 2003. Consistent Tests for Stochastic
Dominance. Econometrica 71(1): 71-104 (January).
[9] Bernard, Andrew, and J. Bradford Jensen. 1999. Exceptional Exporter Performance:
Cause, Eﬀect, or both? Journal of International Economics 47(1): 1-25.
[10] Bernard, Andrew, Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen, and Samuel Kortum. 2003.
Plants and Productivity in International Trade. American Economic Review 93(4):
1268-1290.
[11] Bernard, Andrew, Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott. 2007. Comparative
Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms. Review of Economic Studies 74: 31-66.
[12] Brock, Philip and Helmut Franken. 2003. Measuring the Diﬀerence between Average
and Marginal Interest Rate Spreads in Chile, 1994-2001. Working Paper, University
of Washington.
[13] Brock, Philip and Liliana Rojas-Suarez. 2000. Understanding the Behavior of Bank
Spreads in Latin America. Journal of Development Economics 63: 113-134.
[14] Buch, Claudia M. 2000. Information or Regulation: What is Driving the Interna-
tional Activities of Commercial Banks? Kiel Working Paper No. 1011 (November).
[15] Buch, Claudia M. 2005. Distance and International Banking. Review of International
Economics 13(4): 787-804.
[16] Buch, Claudia M., K. Carstensen and Andrea Schertler. 2005. Macroeconomic Shocks
and Banks’ Foreign Assets. Kiel Working Paper 1254.
[17] Buch, Claudia M. John C. Driscoll and Charlotte Ostergaard. 2005. Cross-Border
Diversiﬁcation in Bank Asset Portfolios. European Central Bank Working Paper No.
429 (January).
29[18] Carlstrom, C.T. and T.S. Fuerst. 1997. “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis,” The American Economic
Review, 87(5): 893—910.
[19] Cetorelli, Nicola and Linda S. Goldberg. 2008. Banking Globalization, Monetary
Transmission, and the Lending Channel. Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
[20] Claessens, Stijn, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Harry Huizinga. 2001. How Does Foreign
Entry Aﬀect Domestic Banking Markets? Journal of Banking and Finance 25: 891-
911.
[21] Claessens, Stijn and Luc Laeven. 2004. What drives bank competition? Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 36(3): 563-583.
[22] Cordella, Tito and Eduardo Levy Yeyati. 2002. Financial Opening, Deposit Insurance,
and Risk in a Model of Banking Competition. European Economic Review 46(3): 471-
485.
[23] Corvoisier, Sandrine & Gropp, Reint, 2002. ”Bank concentration and retail interest
rates,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(11): 2155-2189.
[24] Croft, Elizabeth W. and Barbara J. Spencer. 2004. Fees and Surcharging in ATM
Networks: The Role of Nonbanks and Depositor Base. NBER Working Papers 9883.
[25] Dages, B. Gerard, Linda Goldberg, and Daniel Kinney. 2000. Foreign and Domes-
tic Bank Participation in Emerging Markets: Lessons from Mexico and Argentina.
Economic Policy Review, September: 17-36.
[26] de Blas, Beatriz and Katheryn N. Russ. 2009. Technology versus Contestability in
the Banking Sector. Manuscript, University of California, Davis. August.
[27] Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Luc Laeven and Ross Levine. 2003. Regulations, Market Struc-
ture, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation. NBER Working Papers
9890.
[28] Dixit, Avinash and Joseph Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Variety. American Economic Review 67(3): 297-308.
30[29] Focarelli, Dario and Fabio Panetta. 2003. Are Mergers Benﬁcial to Consumers?
Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits. American Economic Review 93(4):
1152-1172.
[30] Ghironi, Fabio and Viktors Stebunovs. 2007. The Domestic and International Eﬀects
of Financial Integration. Boston College Working Paper.
[31] Goldberg, Linda. 2007. Financial Sector FDI and Host Countries: New and old lessons.
FRBNY Economic Policy Review (March): 1-17.
[32] Hannan, Timoth H. and Robin A. Prager. 1998. Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers
Generate Signiﬁcant Price Eﬀects? Evidence from the Banking Industry. The Journal
of Industrial Economics 46(4): 433-452.
[33] Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2003. Exports versus
FDI. NBER Working Papers 9439.
[34] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Thomas Moore. 1997. The Journal of Political Economy,
105(2): 211-248.
[35] Mandelman, Federico S. 2006. Business Cycles and Monetary Regimes in Emerging
Economies: A Role for a Monopolistic Banking Sector. Federal Reserve Banks of
Atlanta Working Paper No. 2006-17.
[36] Manzano, George and Emilio Neri. 2001. Foreign Bank Entry, Bank Spreads, and
the Macroeconomic Policy Stance. Philippine APEC Study Center Network Working
Paper No. 2001-07.
[37] Martinez-Peria, Maria Soledad and Ashoka Mody. 2004. How Foreign Participa-
tion and Market Concentration Impact Bank Spreads: Evidence from Latin America.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36(3): 511-544.
[38] Melitz, Marc J. 2003. The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and
Aggregate Industry Productivity. Econometrica 71(6): 1695-1725.
[39] Nocke, Volker and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2007. Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions
vs. Greenﬁeld Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity. Journal
of International Economics 72(2): 336-365.
31[40] Reinhart, Carmen and Ioannis Tokatlidis. 2001. Berfore and After Financial Liber-
alization. Mimeo, University of Maryland.
[41] Russ, Katheryn N. 2007. The Endogeneity of the Exchange Rate as a Determinant of
FDI: A Model of Entry and Multinational Firms. Journal of International Economics
71(2): 344-372.
[42] Shikimi, Masako. 2005. Do Firms Beneﬁt from Multiple Banking Relationships?
Evidence from Small- and Medium-Sized Firms in Japan. Hi-Stat Discussion Paper
Series No. 70 (January).
[43] Stebunov, Viktors. 2006. Finance as a Barrier to Entry: US Bank Deregulation and
Volatility. Mimeo, Boston College.
[44] Streb, Jorge M., Javier Bolzico, Pablo Druck, Alejandro Henke, Jose Rutman, and
Walter Sosa Escudero. 2003. Bank Relationships: Eﬀect on the Availability and
Marginal Cost of Credit for Firms in Argentina. In Credit Constraints and Invest-
ments in Latin America, ed. by Arturo Galindo and Fabio Schiantarelli. Washington,
DC: Inter-American Development Bank. (Also CEMA Working Paper (Serie de Doc-
umentos de Trabajo) No. 216).
[45] Vennet, Rudi Vander. 2002. in Herrmann H. and Lipsey R. (eds.), Foreign direct
investment in the real and ﬁnancial sector of industrial countries, Springer Verlag,
295-315.
[46] Vera, Leonardo, Luis Zambrano-Sequin, and Andreas Faust. 2007. The Eﬃciency-
Stability Trade-Oﬀ: The case of high interest rate spreads in Venezuela. The Devel-
oping Economies 45(1): 1-26.
A Summary Statistics
We present here net interest rate margins and two measures of costs for individual banks
reporting consolidated balance sheets in 2000 and 2006 from the Bankscope databases.
Since a number of studies have already documented the fact that foreign-owned banks
tend to have higher net interest margins and lower costs using regression analysis, here
32we examine whether the distributions shift in the way the model would predict following
cross-border merger waves in the ﬁnancial sector, given that there may also be cross-border
arms-length lending. We narrow the sample to the 80 countries for which there were at
least ﬁve observations for net interest margins in 2000 (or 2001, for India and Pakistan)
and 2006.
A.1 Identifying surges in ﬁnancial FDI
Liberalization with respect to the entry of foreign banks can take place legally without being
followed by actual entry. Thus, we use a de facto indicator for liberalization, identifying
countries which have experienced a surge in foreign takeovers of domestic banks within the
sample period (2000-2006). For this task, we use data on cross border M&As from the
Thomson SDC Platinum database involving lending or depository institutions as acquirors
or targets from 1984-2005. There are many ways to identify a surge. A very simple rule
would be to select countries for whom the annual number of cross-border M&As is twice
as high for any year within the sample period as it had been in any year preceding the
sample period. Using this method, we identify four countries: China, Indonesia, Taiwan,
and Turkey.
A more sophisticated method involves testing for structural breaks in the series, count-
ing those countries for which a break to a higher mean (for any length of time) occurs
between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2005 as having a surge during the sample pe-
riod. Using code from Bai and Perron (2003),26 one can try to pinpoint such breaks using
four diﬀerent methods. The Bai-Perron method provides alternative ways of testing for
the absence of a structural break (the null hypothesis) against the existence of a particular
number of strucutral breaks (sup-F) or against an unknown number of breaks (UDmax and
WDmax). Once the null has been rejected, the method tests for the number of structural
breaks sequentially up to a maximum of 5 possible breaks (1 versus 2, 2 versus 3 ...), and
also uses information criteria for the choice of structural breaks. To be conservative, we use
the UDmax and WDmax and sup-F tests to determine whether the series shows structural
breaks, and then the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to test for the number of break
points. This is what we refer to as “all tests.” When there is disagreement between the
tests (mainly because the sup-F sometimes fails to reject the null of no structural break
when the UDmax, WDmax, and BIC tests do reject it), we follow the indications given
26Available on Pierre Perron’s website in a very user-friendly format.
33Year No.Obs. Mean St.Dev. Skew Min Max
No M&A surge after 1999
(69 countries)
Net Interest Margins
2000 2355 3.61 2.74 2.48 -1.33 23.21
2006 2304 3.20 2.51 2.49 -1.28 21.65
% change -11.34 -8.61 0.44 -3.76 -6.72
Overhead Costs
Total Earning Assets
2000 2361 0.05 0.08 6.34 0.00 1.00
2006 2306 0.04 0.08 6.67 0.00 0.87
% change -11.22 -4.05 5.13 4.85 -12.87
Personnel Costs
Total Earning Assets
2000 2210 0.02 0.04 6.79 0.00 0.48
2006 2195 0.02 0.03 6.16 0.00 0.41
%change -12.01 -17.86 -0.09 16.78 -14.74
M&A surge after 1999
(11 countries)
Net Interest Margins
2000 337 4.44 5.01 1.83 -1.31 22.99
2006 425 3.52 3.14 2.32 -1.19 20.48
% change -20.79 -37.24 27.23 -9.16 -10.92
Overhead Costs
Total Earning Assets
2000 346 0.05 0.06 2.77 0.00 0.42
2006 436 0.04 0.04 5.89 0.00 0.53
% change -28.37 -25.26 112.41 -12.40 27.82
Personnel Costs
Total Earning Assets
2000 174 0.03 0.03 2.52 0.00 0.20
2006 276 0.02 0.02 4.07 0.00 0.21
% change -37.47 -36.96 61.66 -8.82 6.19
See App. A for description of data and methodology
Table 3: FDI Surges and the distribution of markups and costs
34by the BIC. The Bai-Perron code conveniently estimates the mean of a series before and
after each break point. We consider that a surge has occurred only if the mean increases
after a break identiﬁed using the BIC.
We collapse the Thomson data into quarterly series and identify seven countries as
having a surge during the sample period according to all tests— China, Indonesia, Lithuania,
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey. We further identify
ﬁve more surges using only the BIC which are not indicated by any other test results.
These are the Cayman Islands, Croatia, Estonia, Japan, Lithuania, and Taiwan. Another
group appears to have a surge that began before and ended after 2000 according to the BIC
minimization. These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary,
India, Norway, Peru, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Venezuela.27 28 In
the analysis below, we focus only on countries experiencing a surge during the sample period
and ignore the countries in mid-surge at the beginning of 2000 except when speciﬁed. We
use the 12 countries with surges during the sample identiﬁed using the BIC as our baseline
list of “surge countries.”
Table A.1 shows summary statistics for net interest margins, the ratio of overhead
expenses to total interest earning assets, and the ratio of personnel expenses to total
interest earning assets for the entire panel of 80 countries, split by whether there is at
least one test indicating that there was a surge in foreign takeovers in the ﬁnancial sector
between 2000 and 2005 for any length of time.
A.2 Bank-level data in detail
The variables used for the empirical analysis are obtained from Bankscope database for
the period 2000-2006 at an annual frequency. In particular, the variables employed are:
- Net interest margin: This ratio is the net interest income expressed as a percentage of
earning assets. The higher this ﬁgure the cheaper the funding or the higher the margin the
bank is commanding. Higher margins and proﬁtability are desirable as long as the asset
quality is being maintained.
- Ratio of overhead expenses to total interest earning assets: Non interest expenses or
overheads plus provisions give a measure of the cost side of the banks performance relative
27Within this group of countries that were “mid-surge” in 2000, at the time our bank data sample begins,
the results described below hold only for countries with surges beginning in 1999.
28The M&A series have at most 87 observations and in many cases less than half that number. In this
Appendix we report results for countries experiencing surges that begin before and end after 2000.
35to the assets invested.
- Ratio of personnel expenses to total interest earning assets
-Ratio of deposits to loans (for empirical estimation of  and )
We eliminate the 1st and 99th percentile for each variable within each country’s obser-
vations in each year.
B The Merger Market
Suppose that ∗
1()  1() Any acquiror also must oﬀer at least as much as the target
bank would earn independently in the new liberalized environment. To calculate these
amounts, both the acquiror and the target take as given that all potential buyouts in other





















¯ 1() is the interest rate that the lowest cost home bank
would charge in the absence of any takeover. The merger market participants take the
aggregate interest rate as given and calculate  as the aggregate interest rate that would
emerge if all possible takeovers (including their own) occurred in every case where ∗
1() 
1().
C Consumer First-Order Conditions























 = ¯ 
−
+1
¯  + h + 
 + 
 = +1 + 
36D Equilibrium
The set of equations governing the steady state open economy equilibrium is given in the
table below. It is similar to the closed economy version in Table 1, plus four new equations,
which include an augmented budget constraint (3’) and market-clearing equation (11’). In
the table below, ()r e p r e s e n t st h e lowest-cost bank supplying niche  in the home
country. Under loan liberalization, this could be either a home or foreign bank. If it is
a foreign bank, then () would be calculated including the distance friction. With
FDI, this could be either a fully domestically owned home bank or a merged bank.
37Consumers
Labor supply  = h
− 1
 (1)
∗ = ∗ (h∗)
− 1

Euler condition ¯  =¯ ∗ = 1
 (2)
Budget constraint  = h + 
 + 
 + (¯  − 1) (3’)
+∗
 − ∗
 +  −  ∗
∗ = ∗h∗ + ∗
 + ∗
 + ∗(¯ ∗ − 1)
+
 − ∗
 +  ∗ − 





Technology  = 1− (4)
∗ = ∗ (∗)
1−










































Market Clearing and Aggregation













∗()( 1 0 )
Goods market clearing  =  +  =  + ∗
 ∗ = ∗ + ∗ = ∗
 +  (11’)



















B a l a n c eo fP a y m e n t s  = 
 − ∗





 −  +  ∗
´
Labor market clearing h =  h∗ = ∗ (14)
Table 4: The open economy
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